Battle of Britain

When I was a small boy ( about 1948-9 ) on the chair by my bed was the HMSO 32page booklet-“ the Battle of Britain”- Published anonymously in March 1941 we now know it was written by Hilary St George Saunders. Once I was past the Janet and John stage of reading I was fascinated by this booklet. I think it was my real start in proper reading as I pored over it. I know from my own children and grandchildren how tenacious early readers can be. I was able a few years ago to buy a facsimile of the booklet and it was so familiar.

Inevitably it was a highly biased and limited account of the Battle. Because it triggered such an interest as a boy I’ve since made something of a study of the Battle – I thought then and I still think it was probably the pivotal Battle of the Twentieth Century.

From my reading I can now see the Battle was in three phases. Firstly the Channel convoy attacks during July and early August 1940 then Secondly the main Battle over southern England where the most ferocious fights took place between mid August and mid September and Thirdly the switch to attacks on London from mid September on.  The Third phase segued into the blitz when London was bombed on over 90 consecutive nights.

It is one of the great unknowns of history what would have happened if the switch to bombing London hadn’t happened. The RAF was reeling and there had been severe damage to six out of seven key aerodromes ( sector stations ). The attack on London gave the RAF respite from aerodrome attacks and gave longer time to intercept attacking aircraft. There is some evidence Churchill deliberately goaded Hitler by having the RAF bomb Berlin.

To step back for a moment the Battle reversed the national stereotypes. Britain had set up a finely organised system of fighter control established by Dowding, head of Fighter Command before the war. The German attack was badly organised with weak intelligence allowing wasted time attacking non fighter airfields. The British control system detected attacks by radar, fed the information to the HQ where it was filtered to pick out feints etc. and information passed to the south eastern sector head, Keith Park. Park was able to mobilise a few aircraft to be in position to oppose most attacks.

In terms of aircraft the fighter types were fairly closely matched. The Germans had a bomber force which was limited both in  type( all were medium sized or smaller ) and the presence of dive bombers which were vulnerable and had to be withdrawn. Britain also had some problem aircraft with the Boulton Paul Defiant which was also withdrawn. The German Air Force had been built up to support their army and wasn’t prepared for the more strategic task.

Britain had “home advantage”. RAF pilots could bale out and be sure of a welcome while German pilots became prisoners. There is evidence Germans feared the channel. While Germany had a decent search and rescue service the prospect of ditching in the sea was frightening.

The main controversy about the Battle was over the “big wing” concept. Leigh Mallory who commanded in the Midlands and didn’t have the south east area to defend advocated assembling several squadrons of RAF fighters in the air before engaging the enemy. Park who was much closer to the channel and German airfields didn’t have the warning time to do this assembly in the air. Most air historians agree Park did exactly the right thing and that Leigh Mallory was wrong. Unfortunately Leigh Mallory was a good lobbyist and persuaded Churchill of his case. Where sufficient warning was available the big wing was possible and led to losses after the Germans switched focus to London.  In fact the Germans were forced to abandon daylight attacks on London and  change to night raids.

Unfortunately both Park and Dowding were treated badly after the battle being swiftly moved on. Leigh Mallory’s machinations had an effect. This extended to the 1969 film “Battle of Britain”. Douglas Bader who was an adviser on the film promotes the big wing as a winner which is simply not true. Bader while heroic was a foolish pilot and even worse tactician.

Winston Churchill summed up the Battle  well with his statement “ never before in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few”